Constitutionality of Direct Action Laws in a Multistate Context: Governmental Interest and the Conflict of Laws by unknown
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF DIRECT ACTION LAWS IN A
MULTISTATE CONTEXT: GOVERNMENTAL INTEREST
AND THE CONFLICT OF LAWS*
IN order to facilitate the compensation of accident victims, several states
have enacted "direct action" laws allowing such victims to sue a tort-feasor's
liability insurer without first obtaining judgment against the tort feasor.1
These statutes impose direct action provisions upon specified liability insurance
policies made within the state.2 Louisiana has the broadest and most explicit
of these laws. Its law applies both to all liability contracts made within the
state, and to all accidents in the state, regardless of where the policies are
written.3 In addition, foreign insurance companies must file written consent
to direct action in order to do business in Louisiana. These direct action
*Watson v. Employers Liab. Assurance Corp., 348 U.S. 66 (1954).
1. As used herein, "direct action" means an action by the injured party directly
against the insurance company, whether alone or joined with the insured. Direct action
after reduction of the claim to judiment is specifically provided for by the present
standard liability policy. 1 A-mERICAN BAR AssociATIoN SEcTIoN Or INSUIRANCt LAW,
INSURANCE POLICY ANNOTATIONS, pt. 1, pp. 42-43 (Supp. 1945) (hereinafter cited as
ABA IN SURANCE ANNOrATIOxS). But direct action against the insurer before reduction
of the claim is specifically forbidden in the standard policy. Ibid. See text at notes
9-10 infra.
2. Those specified may be all policies written in the state, or only all policies insuring
motor carriers. See note 4 infra. Even if policies are writteb without such required pro-
visions, these will be read into them. Dean v. Bituminous Cas. Corp., 72 F. Supp. 801
(W.D. La. 1947); Jacobsen v. Howard, 164 Okla. 88, 23 P.2d 185 (1933).
3. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 22:655 (1950). Section 22:655 and its predecessors fairly
clearly impose a "right of direct action" upon all insurance policies "issued or delivered"
in Louisiana. Louisiana courts implicitly, though not squarely, recognized this right in
suits involving Louisiana contracts and foreign accidents. See, e.g., Burke v. Massachu-
setts Bonding & Ins. Co., 209 La. 495, 24 So. 2d 875 (1946) ; Reeves v. Globe Indemnity
Co., 185 La. 42, 168 So. 488 (1936). A 1950 amendment to the Louisiana law states:
"This right of direct action shall exist whether the policy sued upon was written or de-
livered in the State of Louisiana or not and whether or not such policy contains a pro-
vision forbidding such direct action, provided the accident or injury occurred wqithlit the
State of Louisiana." LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22:655 (1950) (emphasis added). This
section was intended to expand the direct action law to apply to all contracts covering
Louisiana accidents, apparently in response to Belanger v. Great American Indemnity
Co., 89 F. Supp. 736 (E.D. La. 1950), which held that the law did not apply to foreign
no action contracts. See Weingartner v. Fidelity Mut. Ins. Co., 205 F.2d 833 (5th Cir.
1953) (concurring opinion). But in Weingartner, the Fifth Circuit read the phrase empha-
sized above to mean that the law was no longer intended to apply to foreign accidents, even
though it admitted that the law prior to the amendment was so applicable. Ibid. Since
the purpose of the 1950 amendment was to expand rather than to narrow the scope of
the direct action law, the law should be held applicable to foreign accidents.
4. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 22:983, para. E (1950). Louisiana also requires insurers
to designate the Secretary of State as their agent for receipt of substituted service of
process. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 22:982(8), 22:985 (1950).
Besides the Louisiana law, similar laws exist in a number of other states. Wisconsin
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laws favor the injured party by providing a convenient defendant in the case
of an out-of-state tort-feasor, 5 by eliminating a possible second suit against
the insurer after judgment against the insured,0 and by exposing the insurer
to the jury.
7
requires liability insurance to provide that the insurer shall be liable directly to injured
persons, Wis. STAT. § 85.93 (1953), Heinzen v. Underwriters Cas. Co., 203 Wis. 512,
243 N.W. 448 (1932), and also provides that liability insurers may be joined as defendants
with insured tort feasors, Vis. STAT. § 260.11 (1953), Oertel v. Williams, 214 Wis. 6S,
251 N.W. 465 (1933). See Comment, 1953 Wis. L. REv. 683.
Rhode Island provides that injured parties may proceed directly against the insurer
in the event that no process can be served against the insured, but joinder is specifically
forbidden. R.I. GFN. LA-Ws c. 155, § 1 (1938). Direct action against the insurer has
been allowed in other states in connection with compulsory insurance for public motvr
carriers. GA. CoDE ANN. §§ 68-509, 68-612 (Supp. 1951) (joinder) ; IowA, Cois Az.-.. §
325.26 (Supp. 1954) (direct action where no process on insured); WAsH. REV. CoDE §
81.72.060 (1951) (joinder).
In other states joinder has been permitted by implication of compulsory insurance laws.
Graves v. National Mut. Cas. Co., 164 Kan. 267, 183 P.2d 945 (1948) ; Massey v. War
Emergency Co-operative Ass'n, 209 S.C. 292, 39 S.E.2d 907 (1946). But cf. American
Fidelity & Cas. Co. v. McClendon, 125 Tex. 41, 81 S.W.2d 493 (1935).
There seems to be a tendency in other states to limit rather than expand the scope of
direct action. See, e.g., North Carolina: Williams v. Frederickson Motor Express Lines,
195 N.C. 682, 143 S.E. 256 (1928), N.C. GEN. STAT. § 62-121.61 (1950) (legislative pro-
hibition of joinder) ; Alabama: Baggett v. Jackson, 244 Ala. 404, 13 So. 2d 572 (1943)
(law changed to provide that insurer is liable only to pay "any final judgment"); West
Virginia: Cramblitt v. Standard Acc. Ins. Co., 116 W. Va. 359, 180 S.E. 434 (1935), V. VA.
CODE Ai-Nr. § 1492 (1949 and Supp. 1953) (statute authorizing joinder repealed).
See, generally, 8 APPLEmAN, INsURA-CE LAW An PRAcricE §§ 461-66 (1942).
5. This is so in the case where the foreign tort feasor is not subject to suit in the
state. In the principal case, for e.x-ample, it was a manufacturer who could not be served
with process in Louisiana. Watson v. Employers Liab. Assurance Corp., 343 U.S. 66,
72 (1954). Out-of-state motorists, however, are subjected to local suit by the substituted
service law. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 13:3474-75 (1950).
The general purpose of direct action laws is said to be the protection of the public.
Davies v. Consolidated Underwriters, 199 L.a. 459, 476, 6 So. 2d 351, 357 (1942). The
very wording of some such statutes reflects this purpose. Western Automobile Cas. Co.
v. Burnell, 17 Tenn. App. 687, 690, 71 S.W.2d 474, 475-76 (1933) ("for the benefit of the
public").
6. Although the standard liability policy provides that the insurer %%i:l pay any final
judgment against the insured, 1 ABA INSURANCE ANNoTATiONS, pt. 1, p. -I, the insurer
may be unwilling to perform the contract. The injured party may have to pruceed
separately against the insurer, suffering the trouble and expense of a second suit, possibly
in a distant forum, and running the chance that the insurer may successfully interpose
defenses on its contract with the insured, such as non-cooperation or failure to give notice
of loss. The insurer usually may not be depriied of such defenses in a direct suit. See
LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 22:655 (1950). But cf. West v. Monroe Bakery, 217 La. 189, 46
So. 2d. 122 (1950).
7. The belief is widespread that exposure of the insurer to the jury increases the
likelihood and the size of plaintiffs' verdicts. See, e.g., Belanger v. Great American
Indemnity Co., 89 F. Supp. 736, 740 (W.D. La. 1950), aff'd, MRS F2d 196 (5th Cir. 1951 ;
Appleman, Joinder of Policyholder and Insurer as Parties Defendant, 2 . L. REV.
75 (1938). But see 2 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 282a (3d ed. 1940).
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To the degree that direct action laws offer special protection to accident
victims, they disadvantage the insurer, which must pay for that special pro-
tection.8 For this reason, insurers commonly insert in their contracts clauses
forbidding direct action.9 These "no action" clauses are enforceable every-
where except where they are overridden by direct action laws.10
Insurance companies cannot avoid the direct action statute where the con-
tract, the accident, and the suit all originate within the same state." But tort
suits against insurers frequently involve the laws of several states, only one
of which will usually have a direct action law. In these interstate situations,
insurance companies have managed to avoid the operation of direct action
laws by invoking conflict of laws doctrines or by raising constitutional ob-
jections.
Several conflict of laws formulae have been applied to these interstate prob-
lems, with inconsistent results. Some courts have characterized the direct
action law as a "procedural" law of the forum and therefore have found it
applicable to a foreign contract. 1 2 And foreign courts have refused to apply
the law because it was procedural, even though both accident and contract were
in the direct action state.13 Some courts have refused to apply a direct action
law on the grounds that it would modify "substantive" rights acquired under
foreign laws ;14 and other courts have occasionally applied a foreign direct
action law in the forum on the ground that it vested substantive rights.',
Again, where the place of contracting was different from the place of the tort,
8. The insurer rather than the plaintiff must bear the added expense of distant
litigation; but this may not be an unexpected expense, since the insurer generally under-
takes the defense of any suit against the insured.
For evidence that premium rates of Wisconsin insurance policies were raised as a
result of the Wisconsin direct action law, see 2 Wisc. LEGiSL. COUNCIL, REi'oT oF TIIL
ComliTrrz ON MOTOR VEHICLE ACCIDENTS, pt. I, p. 6 (1952), cited in Comment, 1953
Wis. L. REV. 688, 715 n.146.
9. 1 ABA INSURANCE ANNOTATIONS, pt. 1, pp. 42-43 (Supp. 1945).
10. See 8 APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRAcrCE 4851 nn.1, 4 (1942). Statutes
specifying that there must be judgment against the insured before any action can lie
against the insurer are not uncommon. Id. at 4852.
"No action," like its complementary term "direct action," see note 1 supra, is used
herein to denote actions against the insurer before reduction of the claim against the
insured.
11. See cases cited in note 4 supra.
12. Robbins v. Short, 165 So. 512 (La. App. 1936) ; Bouis v. Aetna Cas. & Surety
Co., 91 F. Supp. 954 (W.D. La. 1950); Oertel v. Williams, 214 Wis, 68, 251 N.W.
465 (1933).
13. Wells v. American Employers Ins. Co., 132 F.2d 316 (5th Cir. 1942); National
Mut. Cas. Co. v. Blackford, 200 Ark. 847, 141 S.W.2d 54 (1940) ; McArthur v. Maryland
Cas. Co., 184 Miss. 663, 186 So. 305 (1939).
14. Bayard v. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co., 99 F. Supp. 343, 354-55 (W.D. La. 1951):
Bankers Indemnity Co. v. Bryant, 184 F.2d 1018, 1020 (10th Cir. 1950) ; Kilcuyne v.
Trausch, 222 Wis. 528, 269 N.W. 276 (1936).
15. Kertson v. Johnson, 185 Minn. 591, 242 N.W. 329 (1932); Burkett v. Globe
Indemnity Co., 182 Miss. 423, 181 So. 316 (1938), overruled, McArthur v. Maryland
Cas. Co., 184 Miss. 663, 186 So. 305 (1939).
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courts have sometimes characterized direct action as a matter of "tort"10 or of
"contract" ;17 such characterization has generally resulted in choice of the law
of the place lacking a direct action statute. Finally, direct action has been
held prohibited by the public policy of a non-direct action forum. s As a rule,
conflicts arguments have been more successful in avoiding foreign direct action
laws than local ones.
Wrhen conflicts arguments have failed to avoid direct action, constitutional
arguments have sometimes succeeded, where foreign no action policies were
involved. The federal courts of Louisiana have been particularly receptive to
these contentions.19 They have held that foreign insurers were denied equal
protection of the laws by being exposed to juries in a state other than the
one where the contract was made, °2 0 and that allowing the direct action law to
override foreign no action clauses constituted an impairment of contracts.-'
16. Hidalgo v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 104 F. Supp. 230, 231 (W.D. La. 1952), aff'd,
205 F.2d 834 (5th Cir. 1953); Buxton v. Midwestern Ins. Co., 102 F. Supp. 500
(W.D. La. 1952).
17. Ritterbusch v. Sexinith, 256 Wis. 507, 513, 41 N.W2d 611, 614 (1950) ; Wheat
v. White, 38 F. Supp. 796 (E.D. La. 1941).
18. Lieberthal v. Glens Falls Indemnity Co., 316 Mich. 37, 24 N.W2d 547 (1946).
19. The Louisiana state courts, turning aside constitutional attacks, have reasoned
that the direct action law was both procedural, Churchman v. Ingrain, 56 So. 2d 297
(La. App. 1952), and substantive, West v. Monroe Bakery, 217 La. 1S9, 46 So. 2d 122
(1950), and have held it applicable both to foreign no action contracts, Robbins v. Short,
165 So. 512 (La. App. 1936), and to foreign accidents, Reeves v. Globe Indemnity Co., 185
La. 42, 168 So. 488 (1936).
The federal district courts first gave the direct action law a mixed reception. Compare
Wheat v. White, 33 F. Supp. 796 (E.D. La. 1941) (foreign law applicable to foreign
no action contract), with Rogers v. American Employers Ins. Co., 61 F. Supp. 142 (W.D.
La. 1945) (Louisiana law procedural, and applicable). A slight modification of the word-
ing of the law in 194S resulted in a holding that it was no longer intended to apply to
foreign contracts. Belanger v. Great American Indemnity Co., 89 F. Supp. 736 (E.D.
La. 1950), aff'd, 188 F.2d 196 (5th Cir. 1951). The Louisiana legislature then passed a
joint resolution declaring that it had never intended to change the law, 13 F.2d at 197-93,
and amended the law to make it specifically applicable to insurance policies wherever
issued, La. Acts 1950, No. 541, § 1, LA. Rxv. STAT. ANN. § 22:655 (1950). However, the
federal courts then found that the direct action law was substantive, and held it uncon-
stitutional when applied to foreign no action contracts. See, e.g., Bayard v. Traders &
Gen. Ins. Co., 99 F. Supp. 343 (W.D. La. 1951), inotion for new trial dericd, 104 F.
Supp. 7 (1952) ; Bish v. Employers Liab. Assurance Corp., 102 F. Supp. 343 (W.D. La.),
afr'd, 202 F.2d 954 (5th Cir. 1952), rezed on rehearing (following the Supreme
Court decision in the principal case), 217 F.2d 953 (1955) ; Fisher v. Home Indemnity
Co., 198 F.2d 218 (5th Cir. 1952). But cf. Buxton v. Midwestern Ins. Co., 102
F. Supp. 500 (W.D. La. 1952) (consent provisions of direct action law validate it).
See Notes, 65 HARv. L. Rxv. 688 (1952), 6 VAND. L. RE%% 775 (1933).
20. Bish v. Employers Liab. Assurance Corp., 102 F. Supp. 343, 347 (W.D. La. 1952).
21. Ibid. The Wisconsin direct action law has also been held unconstiutional when
applied to a foreign no action contract, on the ground of impairment of contract. Ritter-
busch v. Sexmith, 256 Wis. 507, 41 N.W2d 611 (1950). The usual rule is that there is
no constitutional impairment of contract when the contract is made after the law is en-
acted. Munday v. Wisconsin Trust Co., 252 U.S. 499 (1920); see tet at note 27 infra.
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Their firmest constitutional ground was the due process clause: the courts
found that the direct action law could not be given extraterritorial effect to
deprive insurers of substantial rights embodied in no action clauses valid in
the state of contracting.
22
In the recent case of Watson v. Employers Liability Assurance Corp.,23 the
Supreme Court ruled for the first time on the application of a direct action law to
an out-of-state no action policy. 24 Plaintiffs, residents of Louisiana, brought suit
for injuries suffered there, from the use of Toni Home Permanents, against the
manufacturer's liability insurer.25 Although the insurer had consented to direct
action in Louisiana, the policy was executed in another state, and contained a no
action clause valid there . 2 The Court summarily rejected the equal protection
and impairment of contracts arguments, reasoning that the law fell with equal
force on all insurance companies doing business within the state and that the con-
tract had been written after the law was enacted.2 7 In answer to the due process
contention, it pointed out Louisiana's "legitimate interest" in providing medi-
cal care and economic assistance to accident victims within the state, and its
corollary interest in insurance contracts designed to compensate such victims.2 8
The Court held these interests sufficient to justify the application of the direct
action law to the foreign policy.29 It also found these interests substantial
enough so that Louisiana was not compelled by the full faith and credit clause
to "subordinate" its direct action law to the law of the state where the contract
was made.30 A concurring opinion reasoned that the law should have been
upheld on the narrower ground that Louisiana had the power to require the
foreign insurer to consent to direct action as a condition of doing business
in the state,31 but the majority found that Louisiana could impose direct action
whether the insurer consented or not.
3 2
22. Bish v. Employers Liab. Assurance Corp., 102 F. Supp. 343, 348 (W.D. La. 1952);
Belanger v. Great American Indemnity Co., 89 F. Supp. 736, 740 (E.D. La. 1950) : Mayo
v. Zurich Gen. Ace. & Liab. Ins. Co., 106 F. Supp. 579, 581 (W.D. La. 1952).
23. 348 U.S. 66 (1954), reversing 202 F.2d 407 (5th Cir. 1953), and 107 F. Supp. 494
(W.D. La. 1952). The Watson case was the last of a series of similar cases in the federal
courts of Louisiana. See note 19 supra.
24. In a companion case to Watson, the Court ruled that in a direct action by a
Louisiana injured party against a foreign insurer alone, there was the diversity between
real parties in interest requisite to federal jurisdiction. Lumbermen's Mut, Cas. Co. v.
Elbert, 348 U.S. 48 (1954).
25. Watson v. Employers Liab. Assurance Corp., 348 U.S. 66, 67 (1954).
26. The policy was negotiated and issued in Massachusetts and delivered in Illinois,
in both of which states the no action clause would have been valid. Id. at 67-68.
27. Id. at 70.
28. Id. at 72-73.
29. Ibid.
30. Id. at 73.
31. Id. at 74 (Justice Frankfurter). The determination of whether a state can require
consent to direct action as a price of doing business in the state apparently also requires
an assessment of the state's governmental interests. Frankfurter found the Louisiana
consent requirement reasonable because "the conditions imposed are fairly related to the
interests which Louisiana may appropriately protect in surrendering its right to exclude
[Vol. 64
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Since the foreign insurer in Watson had qualified to do business in Louisi-
ana, it was clearly subject to suit there.as But the Court's approval of direct
action regardless of the insurer's consent suggests that a state may subject a
foreign insurer to local suit and direct action even when it has not qualified
to do business there. In order constitutionally to subject a foreign non-qualified
corporation to suit within the state, the state must have certain "minimum
contacts" with the corporation.34 Louisiana law provides that issuance of an
insurance policy to a Louisiana resident shall subject a non-qualified insurer
to local suit,35 and issuance of such a policy may be a sufficient "contact" to
make this constitutionally permissible.30 Moreover, Louisiana's direct action
law applies to all insurance policies "delivered" in Louisiana, 37 and since the
governmental interest test is much like the "minimum contacts" test, IVatson
may imply that a non-qualified insurer can also be subjected to direct action
on a local policy. A more serious question would arise if Watson were inter-
preted to imply that a policy simply covering Louisiana risks, even though
issued by a non-qualified foreign insurer to a foreign insured, would permit
the imposition of the direct action law. It could be argued that an insurance
policy intended to compensate a local accident victim was a sufficient "contact"
with the foreign insurer for the expression of Louisiana's governmental inter-
est. If the Court in Watson had based its decision on the insurer's explicit
consent to the direct action provision which Louisiana had a reasonable right
to require as a condition of doing business,3 8 it would have avoided these juris-
dictional implications.
The Supreme Court in deciding Watson was faced with two competing
lines of decisions. In Hartford Accident & Indennity Co. v. Delta & Pine
Land Co.,39 it had considered whether Mississippi could impose its statute of
a foreign corporation." Id. at 82. See cases cited id. at 74-83 (concurring opinion),
especially Washington v. Superior Court, 289 U.S. 361 (1933) (substituted service of
process a reasonable condition of doing business in the state).
32. Watson v. Employers Liab. Assurance Corp., 348 U.S. 66, 73-74 (1954).
33. See notes 4 and 26 supra, and accompanying text.
34. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945); Parmalce v.
Iowa State Traveling Men's Ass'n, 206 F2d 518, 521 522 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S.
877 (1953).
35. LA. REv. STAT. AmN. § 22:1253 (1950); this is section 5 of the Uniform Un-
authorized Insurers Act, 9A ULA 352 (1951). See Storey v. United Ins. Co., 64 F. Supp.
896 (E.D.S.C. 1946) (non-qualified insurer subject to suit under this section bc-ause uf a
policy mailed to a local resident). Cf. Parmalee v. Iowa State Traveling Men's Ass'n,
206 F.2d 518 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 877 (1953) (similar law). However, the
Fifth Circuit held a non-qualified insurer delivering policies within Louisiana was not
subject to suit under this section. Employers Liab. Assurance Corp. v. Lejeune, 189 F.2d
521 (5th Cir.), cert. denied sub norn. Lejeune v. Excess Ins. Co., 342 U.S. 869 (1951).
36. See Travelers Health Ass'n v. Virginia, 339 U.S. 643 (1950) (issuance of policy
to local resident subjected non-qualified insurer to process for administrative precetding ;
accord, Parmalee v. Iowa State Traveling Men's Ass'n, supra note 35.
37. See note 3 supra.
38. See text at note 31 smpra.
39. 292 U.S. 143 (1934).
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limitations on an insurance contract made in Tennessee and embodying a
shorter limitation of action valid there. 40 The Court found that Mississippi's
interest in the contract was so slight as not to permit application of the statute,
even though the risk insured against occurred in Mississippi and one of the
parties had its principal place of business there.41 This case has been inter-
preted as holding that "extraterritorial" modification of a contract by a state
other than the one where it is made violates due process. 42  However, in
Pacific Employers Insurance Co. v. Industrial Accident Commission,4" the
Court had considered whether California could apply its workmen's compen-
sation law to a Massachusetts employment contract where the injury occurred
in California while the employee was temporarily located there. It held that
California had sufficient governmental interest to apply its law in the face of
a conflicting Massachusetts compensation statute.44  In Watson, the Court
chose the Pacific Employers rationale and distinguished Hartford by empha-
sizing references made there to Mississippi's lack of interest in the contract,.0
By assimilating Hartford to Pacific Employers, the Court may have laid to
rest the extraterritorial concept of due process. 40
Watson's extension of the governmental interest formula into the field of
40. Hartford Acc. & Indemnity Co. v. Delta & Pine Land Co., 292 U.S. 143
(1934).
41. Ibid. The federal courts of Louisiana found Hartford controlling with respect to
the application of the Louisiana law to foreign contracts. Belanger v. Great American
Indemnity Co., 89 F. Supp. 736, 739 (E.D. La. 1950); Bayard v. Traders & Geu. Ins.
Co., 99 F. Supp. 343, 355 (W.D. La. 1951).
42. See cases cited note 41 supra. See opinions in Order of United Commercial
Travelers v. Wolfe, 331 U.S. 586, 623, 628 n.2 (1947). But cf. Citizens Nat'l Bank v.
Waugh, 78 F.2d 325, 326-27 (4th Cir. 1935). The Court in Watson called Hartford
representative of the "extraterritorial concept of due process." Watson v. Employers
Liab. Assurance Corp., 348 U.S. 66, 71 (1954).
43. 306 U.S. 493 (1939).
44. The facts in Pacific Employers were the converse of those in Alaska Packers
Ass'n v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 294 U.S. 532 (1935), where the employment contract
was entered into in California by California residents but the employment and the injury
took place in Alaska. In Alaska Packers, Mr. Justice Stone expounded the governmental
interest test which he later applied in Pacific Employers, holding that California's applica-
tion of her workmen's compensation statute did not violate either due process or full
faith and credit. Pacific Employers, although it followed Alaska Packers, decided tle
validity of the law only in terms of full faith and credit. However, the Court there said
that it was "not open to question" that in due process terms either state could apply its
workmen's compensation statute. Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Industrial Accident
Comm'n, 306 U.S. 493, 500 (1939). On these two cases and the governmental interest
test, see Notes, 39 CoLul. L. REv. 1024 (1939), 35 CoLu. L. REv. 751 (1935).
45. Watson v. Employers Liab. Assurance Corp., 348 U.S. 66, 71, 73 (1954). In
Hartford, Mississippi's interest in the welfare of the injured party might well have been
considered greatly diminished by the fact that that party had in effect waived the protection
of the Mississippi statute of limitations by contracting for a shorter one.
46. Hartford had previously been reconciled with the governmental interest approach.




liability insurance seems appropriate. 7 State concern for the welfare of acci-
dent victims underlies the regulation of liability insurance as well as workmen's
compensation.48 This formula should produce a desirable flexibilty in future
decisions in the field. For while the extraterritorial due process concept tends
to sanctify contract rights by preventing their modification in other states,40
the governmental interest test weighs the relative importance of such contract
rights against a state's interests that may impinge upon those rights. In full
faith and credit terms, the governmental interest test weighs competing states'
interests in the protection of both accident victims and contracting parties!t"
And presumably it gives due regard to the comparative vigor with which the
competing states have expressed their interests.r'
In Pacific Employers the Supreme Court suggested that either of the states
whose workmen's compensation laws were involved had sufficient interest in
the welfare of the accident victim to apply its law to the injury in questiun
without denying full faith and credit to the law of the other state. 2 Since the
interests of both states were of the same order, either could apply its own la,.
47. Both Pacific Employers and Alaska Packers, see text and notes 43-44 supra, in-
volved workmen's compensation laws. See also Pink v. A.A.A. Highway Express, Itc.,
314 U.S. 201 (1941) (Georgia has sufficient interest to determine whether her citizens
have become assessable members of a New York mutual insurance association). In other
fields, however, the law of the state with the predominant interest is not always found
controlling. See, e.g., Hughes v. Fetter, 341 U.S. 609 (1951) (wrongful death statute) ;
Order of United Commercial Travelers v. Wolfe, 331 U.S. 586 (1947) (fraternal benefit
society).
48. The states' special concern for the regulation of workmen's compensation and insur-
ance has long been recognized. See New York Cent. R.R. v. White, 243 U.S. 188 (1917)
(workmen's compensation); Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 403 (1946)
(insurance).
49. See Hartford Acc. & Indemnity Co. v. Delta & Pine Land Co., 292_ U.S. 143,
150 (1934) (a state may not "enlarge the obligations of the parties" to a foreign
contract). Justice Frankfurter's concurrence stated that Watson allowed for the first
time the "rewriting of a contract and enforcing it in a manner contrary to the under-
taking of the makers." Watson v. Employers Liab. Assurance Corp., 348 U.S. 66, 70
(1954). But in Pacific Employers, a state was in fact allowed to vary contractual rights
and duties arising elsewhere. See, also, F. A. Straus & Co. v. Canadian Pac. M.R., 254
N.Y. 407, 173 N.E. 564 (1930) (New York refused to enforce a limitation of liability in
an English carrier contract).
50. Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 294 U.S. 532, 547
(1935). The Court in Watson pointed out that 'Massachusetts had interests in the contract
because it had been formally executed in that state and the insured had an office there.
Watson v. Employers Liab. Assurance Corp., 343 U.S. 66, 73 (1954). Justice Frank-
furter elaborated on these interests. Id. at 75. The interests of a state in accident victims
are discussed in the text at note 28 supra.
51. Thus, Pacific Employers distinguished the earlier case of Bradford Electric
Light Co. v. Clapper, 286 U.S. 145 (1932), partly on the basis that application in Ne
Hampshire of the Vermont workmen's compensation law would not be "obnoxium" to
the "policy" of New Hampshire, implying that New Hampshire could have had a policy
so explicit as to prevent the application of any la%,. but its own. Pacific Employrs Ins.
Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 306 U.S. 493, 504 (1939).
52. Id. at 499-500.
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But the interests to be balanced in a liability insurance transaction are not of
the same order: interests in contracts and the rights of contracting parties must
be balanced against interests in the welfare of injured persons. Watson seems
to hold not that the competing interests were so evenly balanced that the forum
could apply its own law, but that they were of unequal weight, and that the
interests in the accident victim predominated. 3
Watson forecloses most constitutional attacks on direct action laws and
suggests certain constitutional limitations upon permissible conflict of laws
decisions involving these laws. 54 Watson decided that there is no constitutional
barrier to the imposition of a direct action law by the state where the accident
occurred, or where the victim is located.' The case may mean that the
interests of this state are so substantial that they must override the interests
of the state where the no action contract is written even when suit is brought
in the contract state.5 6 However, the state where a contract is made also has
a strong interest in insurance contracts written subject to its laws,5 7 and if
these laws require direct action, it is doubtful that any state without such
laws has sufficient interest to ignore the direct action law thus embodied in
the contract. For even if the non-direct action state is the place of the accident
53. Watson v. Employers Liab. Assurance Corp., 348 U.S. 66, 72-73 (1954). Watson,
by emphasizing the interests of the state of the accident and minimizing those of the
state of contracting, follows Pacific Employers and Alaska Packers, see note 44 supra,
in both of which the crucial governmental interests were in the injured person. See text
at note 28 supra.
54. As to constitutional limitations on state conflict of laws decisions, see, generally,
Cheatham, Federal Control of Conflict of Laws, 6 VAND. L. REv. 581 (1953); Freund,
Chief Justice Stone and the Conflict of Laws, 59 HARv. L. REv. 1210 (1946) ; Hilpert &
Cooley, The Federal Constitution and the Choice of Law, 25 WASh. IJ.L.Q. 27 (1939),
55. In Watson, the plaintiff was a resident of Louisiana and was also injured there.
The Court did not consider separately the interests of the state where an accident occurs
and those of the state where the victim resides, or must be cared for. The Court's language
refers rather to the location of the accident than to the residence of the victim, Watson v.
Employers Liab. Assurance Corp., 348 U.S. 66, 72 (1954); and the Louisiana law by
its terms applies to local accidents rather than to local victims of accidents. See note 3
supra. But the governmental interests evoked by an accident seem to center in the victim
rather than the place of the accident itself. See note 53 supra. It is possible that the
state of the accident would have very little interest in fact, if the victim were not a
resident and had never called upon that state for any sort of assistance.
In Wisconsin, Watson will undercut Ritterbusch v. Sexmith, 256 Wis. 507, 41 NW.2d
611 (1950), which held that the application of the Wisconsin law to a foreign no action
policy was unconstitutional as an impairment of contract. See text and note 21 supra,
The Wisconsin court might, however, fall back on the conflicts analysis it expounded
there, to find that the law of the place of contracting governs. See text at notes 62-63
infra. Or the court might turn to Wis. CoNsT. art. 1, § 12, which also prohibits impair-
ment of contract.
56. See note 53 supra, and accompanying text. However, the forum is ordinarily
allowed a certain latitude of deference to its own governmental interests. See Alaskla
Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 294 U.S. 532, 547 (1935).
57. See Watson v. Employers Liab. Assurance Corp., 348 U.S. 66, 73 (1954) ; Pacific
Employers Ins. Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 306 U.S. 493, 500 (1939).
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and therefore has a potential interest in accident victims, its laws forbidding
direct action express not its interest in accident victims but its interest in pro-
tecting the contracting parties. And the latter interest seems to be less than
that of the state of contracting. 5 If the forum has no interest in either the
injured person or the contract,r9 it seems unlikely, following t11atson, that it
will be permitted to apply its own direct action law to a no action contract,
or to refuse to apply the direct action law of another state involved in the
transaction.60 And in choosing between the laws of the states involved, the
governmental interest test probably requires the forum to defer to that state
whose law imposes direct action.
Whatever the constitutional limitations set down by 11atson, non-constitu-
tional arguments may still be employed in dealing with direct action laws.
The question whether a direct action law is intended to apply to a given
interstate situation will continue to arise."' And conflict of laws doctrines may
still be invoked.32 But courts deciding which conflicts rule to apply could
profitably consider the Watson rationale. Conflicts characterization resulting in
a reference to place of the tort or place of contracting may recognize the under-
lying governmental interests of the state referred to. But a mechanical con-
flicts formula reflecting only a single interest is inadequate when, as in Watson,
not only tort rights but contractual and statutory rights are involved.c For
58. Hughes v. Fetter, 341 U.S. 609 (1951), where a wrongful death occurred in
Illinois but Wisconsin had a predominant interest in the plaintiff, the decedent and the
defendants, held that Wisconsin could not refuse to enforce the Illinois wrongiul death
statute in its courts. See also First Nat Bank v. United Air Lines, 342 U.S. 395 (1952).
59. See Harmann v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 64 F. Supp. 3t, (W.D.
La. 1946). The Louisiana law does not by its terms apply to such a transaction. See note
3 supra.
60. Courts have in the past refused to apply foreign direct action laws even where
both contract and accident had reference to the direct action state. Liebzrthal v. Glens
Fals Indemnity Co., 316 Mich. 37, 24 N.W.?d 547 (1946) ; Wells v. American Employers
Ins. Co., 132 F.2d 316 (5th Cir. 1942); McArthur v. Maryland Cas. Co., 184 Miss. 0 3,
186 So. 305 (1939).
61. See Riding v. Travelers Ins. Co., 48 RI. 433, 133 At. 186 (1927) (Rhode Island
law not intended to apply to foreign policies); Weingartner v. Fidelity MuL Ins. Co., 205
F2d 833 (5th Cir. 1953) (Louisiana law not intended to apply to foreign accidents).
A preliminary inquiry concerning whether the Louisiana law was intended to apply to
the transactions in question in McArthur and Wells, see note CO supra, might have
avoided the results in those cases: characterizing the Louisiana law as procedural and
therefore finding it inapplicable in a foreign forum.
62. See notes 12-18 supra. The law, for example, might be characterized as pro-
cedural by a foreign forum. But Watson's emphasis on the protection that the direct
action law gave to injured parties implies that the Supreme Court feels the Lo-isia'a
law at least to be substantive.
Wisconsin has both procedural and substantive statutory provisions for direct action.
Recognizing this, the Minnesota court has still managed to avoid the effect of the law
where both accident and contract were in Wisconsin, by "the application of a few simple
rules of the conflict of laws." Anderson v. State Farm Mut. Autu Ins. Cu., 221 Minn. 42S,
432, 24 N.W.2d 836, 839 (1946).
63. The insurer's rights and duties are governed by contract, and yet they hav e refer-
ence to the possible occurrence of a tort. The injured party's rights are essentially tort
1955]
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formal recognition of one state's interest precludes recognition of the interest
of any other state. Watson suggests that in making such conflicts characteriza-
tions courts should weigh all the governmental interests involved. It further
suggests that before a forum can refuse to enforce foreign rights on grounds
of its public policy, it must first determine whether the governmental interests
underlying that policy are sufficient to justify its refusal."4 Application of
governmental interest criteria to conflicts decisions involving direct action laws
should achieve greater uniformity in result than these decisions have hitherto
manifested, 65 for the weight of the governmental interests on each side of the
scales should not vary with the forum.
rights, yet every liability policy extends a contractual right to injured third parties to sue
under the contract. See note 1 supra. And states can and do impose by statute different
and additional rights and duties-direct action among them-upon both contracts negoti-
ated and torts occurring within their boundaries.
64. In Lieberthal v. Glens Falls Indemnity Co., 316 Mich. 37, 24 N.W.2d 547 (1946),
the court held that Michigan public policy forbade direct action against an insurer, even
though the suit involved both a Wisconsin accident and a Wisconsin contract. If a govern-
mental interest argument were to be made, the result might be different, even though
Michigan had an interest in the injured party, a resident of that state. See text at note
58 supra.
65. See cases cited notes 12-18 supra. Uniformity of result regardless of forum is one
of the objectives of conflicts law. GOODRICH, CoNFLICr OF LAws, § 4 (3d ed. 1949).
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